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The normalization of exceptions and the ‘zone of indistinction’- Germany and Egypt

By digitales.flugblatt.kollektiv on 2020/04/03

Today political discourse especially after 9/11, more recent terror-attacks in Europe and the Arab Uprising focuses on security issues and anti-terror legislation. Whereas the cases of Guantánamo (Gregory, 2006) and Palestine (Furani, 2014) are only the most discussed examples Giorgio Agamben argues with his theory that nowadays we live in a sphere of more frequently appearing exceptions that build up a zone of indistinction between the norm and the exception – a legal lawlessness (Agamben, 2005). However, his theory exceeds the claim that the ‘state of exception’ is today becoming the norm – it develops a theory of a legal space for human activity not subject to law.

In this essay I try to explore if Agamben is right to say that politics is entering a ‘zone of indistinction’ in which exceptional legislation is increasingly common and law is increasingly ‘disapplied’. Therefore, I will outline his theory of the ‘state of exception’ first before I examine and evaluate aspects of the security legislation of Germany and Egypt. In the end I will conclude my findings and compare the two cases critically.

Agambens ‘state of exception’

In ‘Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life’, the first book of Giorgio Agamben’s multi- volume Homo Sacer project he points out that we must rethink the concept of sovereignty (Agamben, 1998:109). His theory outlined in the book is based on Carl Schmitt’s ideas on the ‘state of exception’ and the production of a bare human life which is subjected to the sovereign ban (Schmitt, 2004). Responding to Foucault’s theory of biopolitics (Foucault 1990), in which human life becomes the object of the disciplinary power of the state, Agamben points out that there is an invisible connection between sovereign power and biopolitics, embodied in the exceptional basis of State sovereignty.

Sovereign Power and Law

Agamben argues that sovereign power creates itself through the construction of a political order based on the exclusion of bare life. This is achieved by constructing the exception in which the law is suspended from the human being who are in consequence transformed into a status of bare life without legal status (Agamben,1998: 18). In addition, Agamben shows that exceptions made by sovereigns produce the juridical order itself. ‘[T]he rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first

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constitutes itself as a rule’ (Agamben, 1998: 18). Referring to Agamben this (inclusive) exclusion and the creation of bare life constitutes the Western State itself. Another crucial point he makes is that bare life is not ‘simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it’ (Agamben, 1998: 28). Through its own withdraw, the ‘law encompasses living beings’ (Agamben, 2005: 3) who are in the same time bound and abandoned by it. What follows is that the bare life is still included in the juridical order ‘through its exclusion’(Agamben, 1998: 18). To distinguish existence and the belonging to a community, Agamben uses two terms invented by the Greeks. Zoē as the ‘natural reproductive life’ and bios, ‘a qualified form of life’, political life (Agamben 1998: 1).

The state of exception today

Agamben argues that nowadays the state of exception has become a stable stage: ‘the declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government’ (Agamben, 2005: 14). For Agamben the concentration camp is the paradigmatic space of this new political condition and power. It is ‘the space that is opened up when the state of exception begins to become the rule’ (Agamben, 1998: 168-9).

In the following analysis of security legislation in Germany and Egypt I will try to apply Agamben’s theory and explore if the exception becomes the norm and builds up a zone of indistinction.

Security legislation in Germany:

In this part of the essay I will examine the development of security legislation in Germany after 9/11 until today before I analyse specific aspects in relation to Agamben’s theory.

The first reaction to the terror attack in the United States was the development of ‚Sicherheitspaket I‘ which entails the prohibition of being member or supporter of foreign terrorist groups (APUZ 27/11). Justification was that Germany should not be used as hideout for terrorists. Since then all groups with religious goals can be prohibited when they fulfil certain criteria (Bundestagspapier WD3-3000-053/15). In 2002 the ‚Sicherheitspaket II‘ followed that expanded the power and competences of secret service.1 The ‚Office for the Protection of the Constitution‘ was allowed to gather information about bank accounts, communication and personal data.

1 https://netzpolitik.org/2017/chronik-des-ueberwachungsstaates/? fbclid=IwAR1sKstyQ4Hk1ZOrZf9hBcVpVUX1EqMGDc8rbyXI2DJTJa-Sj0ntTCwhcRI

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In the same year the ‚Rasterfahndung‘ (dragnet action) was broadened. Only in 2006 it was restricted as being highly problematic because it’s lack of ‚presumption of innocence‘. This led to the agreement that it should only be used in concrete situations of emergency.2 How these are defined stayed uncertain. A centre to fight Islamist terrorism has been founded that coordinates the work of security officials in the country. Critiques have been made focussing on the indistinction of police and secret service responsibilities. Since 2007 the shared centre for internet affairs is enclosed. In the same year a new migration legislation has been approved which facilitates the expulsion of suspected criminals.

In 2005 an air-security law has been approved which entails the possibility to shoot-down hijacked planes. Nevertheless there has been a huge discussion about it because civilians could be on the plane (Knelangen, 2006). Moreover it would allow the military to interfere in inner security issues which is forbidden by legislation. Nevertheless in 2012 the federal constitutional court decided that it is legal in situations of exception.3 One year later an anti- terror data network has been approved which can be used by both the police and the secret service (van der Sloot et al. 2016). Moreover a law for data-retention was invented that allows to keep the date of telephone, mail and internet user for six months. The protest against it was huge but nevertheless since 2017 Germany has a law for data-retention.4 2009 the training in terror camps were made punishable and in 2011 a national cyber-defense centre has been founded to defend against electronic attacks. 2012 a centre against extremism and terrorism has been opened to resist right wing extremism, left extremism, foreign extremism and espionage. Since 2015 the state is allowed to take away passports of terrorists to inhibit their mobility. Moreover the state police can apply undercover investigations.

After I have examined the development of security and anti-terror legislation in Germany I would like to focus on some specific aspects and their usage in the past. The first law to prohibit religious groups has been used arbitrarily in practice. Whereas many Muslim groups have been forbidden, radical Christian groups could move on without restriction although they fulfilled the criteria as well.5 Here we can see that exceptions are made along blurred postcolonial borders.

  1. 2  http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundesverfassungsgericht-rasterfahndung-nur-noch-bei-konkreter-gefahr- 1329725.html
  2. 3  https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2012/07/up20120703_2pbvu000111.html
  3. 4  https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/vorratsdatenspeicherung-ein-schwarzer-tag-fuer-unsere.1008.de.html? dram:article_id=340281
  4. 5  https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/sicherheit/extremismus-und- terrorismusbekaempfung/vereinsverbote/vereinsverbote-node.html

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Over the years the responsibilities and possibilities of the secret service have been expanded and competences of the police became indisctinct and intransparent as well. Information about people may be collected and even sensible information are not safe from that. In addition, secret service operates undercover and the population never knows how the new competences are carried out in practice. Only scandals made public by whistle-blowers over the years gave an in-view about the performance of the secret service.6 The in 2006 invented ‚Rasterfahndung‘ which means the presumption of people who are more likely to commit crimes was highly controversial. Nevertheless it has been used a lot and also nowadays although it is restricted to cases of immediate danger, it is still common practice.7 Since 2003 another striking step has been made. A law ‚improved‘ the exchange of information between police and secret service. This led to a problematic ‚zone of indistinction‘ as the competences and responsibilities blurred. Also the intensification of migration law led to a problematic practice as suspected individuals could be expelled from Germany more easily. This law is used to this day arbitrarily to get rid of different persons without proven reasons.

Over the years data-retention as well as internet and telephone surveillance came into the focus. Competences have been expanded although there have been huge protests. Whose data is retained and whose internet and telephone is surveilled is in the hand of few officials. Another striking aspect is that the passports of suspects can be taken. This is an enormous interference in human rights as it prevents the mobility and security by law. Since the ‚refugee-crisis‘ we can also observe another phenomenon which is the suspension of Schengen and the re-implementation of border controls in Germany. In practices this led to racial profiling of persons fitting in the imaginative criteria of ‚refugee‘ (Cremer, 2013).

Moreover the blurred lines between police and secret service as well as the competences of military within Germany are striking. The lines are getting more and more indistinctive. Since the usage of military within German borders has not even been thinkable a few decades ago it nowadays is more likely and even debates about usage for protests and big events are common. When it comes to protest a significant example are the G20 protests in Hamburg in 2017. In practice the police had cameras to film the participants (Ullrich 2018), surveillance was omnipresent and undercover investigations have been made as well. Journalists have been prohibited to work and the protesters were not protected by the law anymore (Hunold et al

  1. 6  For example scandal about NSU: https://www.zeit.de/2013/08/Dossier-Verfassungsschutz-NSU- Terrorismus/seite-6
  2. 7  For example: Dragnet investigation of plane travel data: https://www.heise.de/tp/features/BKA-startet- Rasterfahndung-von-Fluggastdaten-4146378.html

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2018). Not only during the G20 summit but also in 2014 there has been the implementation of a ‚Gefahrengebiet‘ in Hamburg which is a law within the police legislation to install a zone where different rules are applied. The zone can be implemented when crimes are expected to happen. The ‚Gefahrengebiet‘ enables the police to control every person without reason and browse their bags. Moreover they can verify their identity and keep information about them. In this case it led to extensive racial profiling as persons of colour were more likely to get controlled. Here we can see a legal space for abandon the usual law with a huge space for different actions and the reduction to bare life.

As the analysis shows the anti-terror and security legislation in Germany developed to a ‚zone of indistinction‘ in which the exceptions were implemented especially along racist, post- colonial borders to exclude ‚the other‘. Persons of colour were constructed as suspicious in general and reduced to bare life in which they can not rely on the usual law.

Security legislation in Egypt:

In this part of the essay I would like to examine the changes within security legislation after the Arab Uprisings in 2011. In this context I have to mention, that this will not include all aspects as the size of this essay doesn’t allow a thorough analysis.
After Mubarak fell a year of interim military rule followed before the first presidential elections in half a century were won by Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi in 2012. One year later there was a growing dissatisfaction with the new government which led to new protests. The military stood with the protesting people and ousted President Morsi. After that the Muslim Brotherhood was constructed as the antagonist and banned from political actions (Mabon, 2017: 1791). The new persons in charge outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and developed a new constitution which restricts media freedom among other aspects. After few months of military government, commander-in-chief Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi won the presidency elections in the May 2014 but after that main objective of the Al-Sisi government seemed to be regime survival and avoiding new protests (Rutherford, 2018).

Since 2013 a large number of presidential decrees have been issued that made authoritarian rule possible without emergency law. Moreover the authorities limited civil society’s freedom of articulation (Grimm, 2015). In late 2013 the Muslim Brotherhood was declared as a terrorist organization. This allowed State Security to raid Islamist associations. Since then the definition of terrorism and terrorist activity was adjusted constantly to include more civil

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actors. In addition, the constitution of 2014 transferred fa-reaching power to the security service. Another law was implemented by decree on 27 October 2014 and defines most public institutions as military installations (Rutherford, 2018). It follows that all crimes can be judged by military courts as well. Another law important to mention is from November 2013 implemented by the interim president which is known as the ‘Protest Law’ and limits the right to protest and the freedom of assembly. The Protest Law allows citizens to ‘organize a meeting, or conduct a procession or protest’ but it determines that a notification at least 3 days before and no more than 15 days in advance is needed. Nevertheless the law enables the government to cancel or postpone any demonstration or political protest. In its 10th article, the law eliminates citizens’ rights of assembly and demonstration in practice. Moreover it doesn’t include the guarantee of safety for demonstrators (Hamzawy, 2017:393). Not following the procedures mentioned is prosecuted as a crime. This Protest Law has led to a de facto ban on all demonstrations. Moreover the law is increasingly being used for demonstrations that happened in the past. As a consequence Egypt has more than 40,000 political prisoners, including prominent activists from the Uprisings. In February 2015 Al-Sisi issued the ‘Law of Organizing the Lists of Terrorist Entities and Terrorists’. This law left huge space for interpretation and enabled the government to surveil and punish persons and groups peacefully opposing politics (Hamzawy, 2017:398). Moreover, crimes can be prosecuted by special courts invented to treat terrorism-related actions with harsher punishment. A new law, implemented in mid August 2015 focuses even on private support of regime critical groups. Moreover, Egypt’s Central Police Force (CPF) has been repeatedly cited by human rights groups and citizens for their personnel’s brutal use of power against protestors and activists (Cherif Bassiouni, 2017: 296). In fact Al-Sisi controls centrally both the armed forces and security services which means that he has a lot of power over national institutions, the legal system, economic activity, and over anti-government activists (Hellyer 2018: 3). Moreover Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi implemented a law that restricts the operations of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Egypt. Many of them promoting and monitoring human rights. The law controls domestic and foreign NGOs and makes it nearly impossible for them to follow their work (Benhamou, 2017: 121).

As the short analysis showed we can observe the installation of a lawful lawlessness in Egypt especially after Al-Sisi took power. People, mostly political activists disappear8 and are sent to prison without trial. The security and anti-terror legislation became broader and was left open

8 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/egypt/report-egypt/

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for arbitrary governments actions and interpretations. Protests and free speech are not possible anymore without fearing detention (Grimm, 2015). The freedom has been restricted in various ways and human activity reduced to bare life. Especially the aspect that the term terrorist has been defined and adjusted to ban political dissidents is striking. Another important aspect is that much power has been handed over to the military and crimes can be judged retroactively. Persons critical of the regime are stripped of legal status and reduced to bare life.

Conclusion: A zone of indistinction?

Both cases show that exceptions within security legislation come up more frequently. In Egypt they especially target people opposing the government whereas in Germany they affect two types of persons, dissidents on the one hand but more significantly persons of colour in general. Exceptions have mostly been made for saving the government and the system. In Egypt this struggle seems to be more essential as persons disappear and are stripped of legal status completely. In Germany on the contrast we can see the exceptions in specific cases and they seem to be frequently but are at the same time embedded in a legal framework and justification process. Nevertheless they should be considered as grave for the persons affected. The lines between exception and usual law are blurred in both cases and the implementation arbitrary. We can observe the same mechanisms of performing power. A striking finding is that the core of sovereignty in both countries is empty. Exceptions can be made and targeted against ‚the other‘.

(2700 words)

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Bibliography:

Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by D. Heller- Roazen. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. Translated by K. Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Benhamou, M. (2017) ‘Can Europe turn the Middle East Turmoil into an Opportunity?’ The State of the Union: Schuman Report 2017 on Europe, pp. 119-124. Brussels: Robert Schuman Foundation.

Cherif Bassiouni, M. (2017) Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and Its Aftermath: 2011- 2016. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cremer, H.r. (2013) “Racial Profiling” – Menschenrechtswidrige Personenkontrollen nach § 22 Abs. 1 a Bundespolizeigesetz: Empfehlungen an den Gesetzgeber, Gerichte und Polizei (Studie / Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte). Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte.

Foucault, M., (1990) The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. Translated by R. Hurley. London: Penguin.

Gregory, D. (2006) The Black Flag: Guantánamo Bay and the Space of Exception, Geografiska Annaler, 88, pp. 405–427.

Grimm, J. (2015). Repressing Egypt’s civil society: state violence, restriction of the public sphere, and extrajudicial persecution (SWP Comments, 41/2015). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit.

Hamzawy, A. (2017): Egypt after the 2013 military coup: Law-making in service of the new authoritarianism, Philosophy and Social Criticism 2017, Vol. 43(4-5) 392–405.

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Hanafi, S. (2012): The Arab Revolutions; the Emergence of a New Political Subjectivity, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5(2), pp. 198–213.

Hellyer, H.A. (2018): ‘Sisi’s Control of Egypt is Absolute’ The Atlantic [online].

Hunold, D./ Knopp, P./ Schmidt, S./Thurn, R./ Ulrich, P. (2018): Policing of the NoG20- Protests in Hamburg in July 2017. Results of a structured protest observation.

Khaled Furani (2014): States of Exception, Ethics and New Beginnings in Middle East Politics, Interventions, 16:3, 346-364.

Knelangen, W. (2006): Innere Sicherheit als neue Aufgabe für die Bundeswehr? In: Krause, Joachim/ Irlenkäuser, Jan (Hrsg.): Bundeswehr – Die nächsten 50 Jahre. S.252-272.

Mabon, S. (2017): Sovereignty, bare life and the Arab uprisings, Third World Quarterly, 38:8, 1782-1799.

Rutherford, B.K. (2018): Egypt‘s New Authoritarianism under Sisi, The Middle East Journal, Volume 72, Number 2, Spring 2018 pp.185-208.

Schmitt, C. (2004): Politische Theologie, Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. 8. Edition. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin.

Ullrich, P. (2018): Videoüberwachung von Demonstrationen und die Definitionsmacht der Polizei. Zwischen Objektivitätsfiktion und selektiver Sanktionierung, TUTS – WP-2-2018.

Van der Sloot, B./ Broeders, D./ Schrijvers, E. (2016): Exploring the Boundaries of Big Data, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

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Online Sources:

https://netzpolitik.org/2017/chronik-des-ueberwachungsstaates/? fbclid=IwAR1sKstyQ4Hk1ZOrZf9hBcVpVUX1EqMGDc8rbyXI2DJTJa-Sj0ntTCwhcRI

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundesverfassungsgericht-rasterfahndung-nur-noch-bei-konkreter-gefahr- 1329725.html

https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2012/07/up20120703_2pbvu000111.html

https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/vorratsdatenspeicherung-ein-schwarzer-tag-fuer-unsere.1008.de.html? dram:article_id=340281

https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/sicherheit/extremismus-und- terrorismusbekaempfung/vereinsverbote/vereinsverbote-node.html

https://www.zeit.de/2013/08/Dossier-Verfassungsschutz-NSU- Terrorismus/seite-6

https://www.heise.de/tp/features/BKA-startet- Rasterfahndung-von-Fluggastdaten-4146378.html

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/egypt/report-egypt/

http://www.bpb.de/apuz/33224/11-september-2001
Maßnahmen des Bundes zur Terrorismusbekämpfung seit 2001 Gesetzgebung und Evaluierung (Aktualisierung der Ausarbeitung WD 3 – 3000 – 044/15 vom 6. März 2015).

Posted in Politische Theorie | Tagged Agamben, Anti-terror-law, State of exception

Visuality and Power – Seeing the extraordinary in International Relations

By digitales.flugblatt.kollektiv on 2020/04/03

Outline

1. Introduction 1-2 2. Visuality in Critical Security Studies 2-3 3. Visual Securitization 3-5 4. What is an image? 5
5. Visuality as power 5-6 6. Seeing the Extraordinary in International Relation 6
6. 1 Postcolonialism and visuality in International Relations 6-8 6. 2 Gender and Visuality in International Relations 8-9 7. Conclusion 9-10 References 11-13 Appendix 14

1. Introduction

Images have the power to make us cry, shock us, change our mindsets, and haunt our thoughts and dreams. Yet images also surround us all the time, hardly noticed, banal and cliche ́d. They comprise a large part of our daily lives, in forming our actions unconsciously. Moreover, since new technologies such as computers and smartphones came up with their nearly global coverage from the beginning of the 21ths century, there is a rise of communication between people all over the world through the internet. The world became a “village” and the access to the internet for more people made it possible to imagine how people live around the world without ever being there. Aforementioned concepts enabled people to follow events on the other side of the globe in real time and made global organization of social movements possible. These new forms of technologies have allowed people to express themselves through blogs, websites, videos, pictures, and other media. New media technologies with their real-time global television coverage, the Internet and smartphones with cameras and video-recording capacity have influenced and changed the relationship between producers and consumers, between elites, for example politicians, and their “audiences”. While it was possible for the elite to address its audience directly through media which was related to certain hierarchies of what is shown and what could be seen during the time of traditional media, new media technologies and easy access to the internet have changed this relationship and the imbalance of power. Of course, it did not change completely and there is for sure a hierarchy of what is shown through media and what kind of images or texts are being read and which are not. The possibility of bringing in more perspectives through media increased with the development and global coverage of new media. This has also an impact on global and national politics. For example the conduct of warfare itself changed: For example the training of soldiers through video games and cyber- simulations to the controlling of unmanned drones from long distances far away was established (Der Derian: 2001). Here we can see that media is becoming an important factor when it comes to global politics. Visuality like images and films is being produced and distributed through the internet and influences the audience as well as the political and social discourse. In that context one has to refer to the real-time coverage of political and historical events like people falling to death on 9/11, the snapshots from Abu Ghraib, and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis.

This transformation driven by new technologies and new media is also influencing the academic world. Next to the studies on the social impact of media there is also a new interest in their implications on political decision-making and International Relations. Moreover since the visual and aesthetic turn (e.g. Bleiker, 2001; Delmont, 2013; Faludi, 2007; Hansen, 2011) in International Relation after the Cold War there is a shift to a new set of problems, in particular the relation between performativity and power in International Relations. Performativity in this context is defined as a “speech act, that creates events or relations in the ́real world ́” (Butler,

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1993:107). ‘Discursive performativity’, Butler (1993:107) argues, ‘appears to produce that which it names, to enact its own referent, to name and to do, to name and to make. … [g]enerally speaking, a performative functions to produce that which it declares’.
Since this change of direction there is a growing interest in understanding the interaction between popular media cultures and security. Within this field images and visuality play a rather ambiguous role in security studies for example in waging wars. Through visuality (in)security is constructed and for example wars can be legitimized or de-legitimized. In that context narratives about the self and other are significant also in relation to the construction of (national) identity (Campbell, 2007:358).

When it comes to the aspect of war visuality is important for example through war photography like Robert Capa’s photo of the Spanish civil war (falling soldier) or Nick Ut’s photos of the Vietnam war. Moreover in the war on terror visuality plays a significant role in justifying the intervention of US troops in Afghanistan. These war photographs and visuality, transported foremost through media, effect emotions directly and seem to bring the spectator closer to the event. War photographs are objects of discourses in society in which they can have different interpretations and performative acts. For example the photography of the “napalm girl” could call for immediate retreat of US-Troops from Vietnam or just for the modification of warfare (Hansen, 2011: 58).

The following paper concerns the role of visuality in security studies. Moreover, it will discuss the performative power of images before it goes deeper into the power structures of securitizing images.
Afterwards this article will make two examples of seeing the extraordinary in International Relations. Firstly postcolonialism and visuality, secondly gender and visuality in International Relations to show how power-structures influence the availability of pictures and visual framing. In the end this article will sum up the findings and give ideas for further research.

2. Visuality in Critical Security Studies

Visuality plays an important role when it comes to Critical Security Studies. As described in the introduction there has been a shift to a new set of problems and new interests. However, many scholars still seem to be skeptical about the powerful impact of images. They argue that the context and the narrative framing are more influential than the pictures themselves (Perlmutter, 1998; Zelizer, 1998). The question posed by these scholars is whether images constitute the passive part of illustrating the framing or if they actually have the power to shape discourses. This paper however points out that the relation between frames and images is a relation of high tension. High-tension relation means the visual framing can support the dominant narrative or disrupt the discourse by opposing the dominant discursive meaning like the images of Abu

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Ghraib did. (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2008) Part of this question is the performative power of visuality on global politics and the discourse about security within society as well as on the political level. As Heck and Schlag put it: “How (in)securities are politically recognized increasingly depends on the availability of images and the ways in which we are able to image what it means for people to live in war-torn societies” (2013: 893).

As the quote illustrates there is a certain relation between the world of politics and media, because everything we know about the world we know through media representing it (Luhmann, 2000: 1). Moreover, media are believed to be a fourth branch of the government, or at least cooperating with part of the total national establishment, and an instrument expressing and promoting national perspectives in international relationships (Merrill, 1995). If so, are images and visual frames only the instrument of illustrating dominant narratives in a discourse or do they have other impacts? Nowadays, where many people have access to the internet and distribute their pictures, while international censorship is a controversial issue these aspects seem to change. In addition, there is a debate about the ethic aspect of media like misusage of images or the usage of visuality for social mobilization. This mechanism is showing for example in the case of the mohammad-cartoon-crisis in Denmark as well as films or pop-cultural artifacts.

Through images myths and justification as well as the ‘other’ is constructed, presented and reproduced (Kellner, 1995). Campbell (2007: 358) states that “visual imagery is of particular importance for geopolitics because it is one of the principal ways in which news from distant places is brought home, constructing the notion of “home” in this process”. Also docudramas are part of this debate, which try to reconstruct certain narratives about critical events, foremost phenomenons with a dislocation in discourse and support dominant narratives. With these works and elements of collective memories they influence world politics and opinions about international relations. Narratives about security and insecurity are constructed, transformed and renewed.

3. Visual Securitization

Before this paper can focus on the securitizing power of images, a definition of security is needed: „Security is a speech act, the act itself carries it meaning“ (Waever, 1995:55). This definition from Waever shows a critical approach to security studies. It defines security as produced by discourse. Threats, justification and possible reactions and treatments are constructed in the discursive field, which depends upon language. Something becomes a security problem through discursive politics. (Campbell, 1992)

Images constitute something or someone as threatened and in need of immediate defense (Hansen, 2011:51). The question to ask is whether images itself can „speak security“. Obviously

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images do not consist of words, texts and speech. However they are often embedded in discourse. For example images in articles are often used for illustration.
But researchers disagree on the issue of performative power of images as a free-standing entity. An argument for the performative power without context would be that images distributed primarily through media can be taken from their context and put into different context or stand without context. Moreover, the spectators often do not know the background-story of a picture but classify what they see and develop an emotional response. When we take for example the prominent war photography of Phan Thị Kim Phúc taken by Nick Út which shows five children running away from something along a road followed by soldiers, most of the people know little about the context, including the persons that are shown or the concrete place, date or situation. The photo comes up from time to time embedded in different discourses. While in the past the focus lay on the terror that is shown, the discourse shifted lastly to the question why the girl is naked on the photo and if it should be censored in the internet (The Guardian Sept. 2016). Additionally, the photo was shaped in different contexts so that for example the soldier on the left side was cut out or the focus shifted (The Guardian April 2015). This has an enormous impact on the photo’s effect. This iconic image has obviously power and can be understood without context, at least the facts that the children are feared, running away and crying are conveyed through the bare image.

Kept in mind while examining the securitizing effect of images language is an important aspect because thinking and interacting with other people is constructed through the combination of words. Many researchers argue that our thinking and expression is limited by language and discourse (Foucault, 2015: 114ff). In order to understand an image language is always necessary because images depend on associations constructed through words which carry broader social concepts. This is why images cannot be seen as free-standing, because we always connect them to experiences and knowledge one had before. When we see the crying children on the photo, the word crying is historically and socially related to certain concepts and expectations. Everything we cannot describe or say yet is not part of the discourse.

But one has to admit that images can have enormous power. When an image reaches iconic status and is being replicated and picked up from different news-platforms it seems to be more effecting and shaping than language. This fact bases on the differences between images, language and words. Hansen states that words and images differ in at least three respects (Hansen, 2011: 55ff.). Firstly, the immediacy which refers to the „immediate, emotive responds that exceeds of texts“. Images bring the spectator closer to the event than words or written texts. Important in this context is the relation between the depicted and the spectator.

Secondly, the circulability, which rests on the social as well as on the material-technological conditions of global distribution.

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Thirdly, the ambiguity which refers to the aspect of different possible meaning or interpretations that are limited by discourse (Hansen, 2011: 55ff.). Some narratives are privileged while others are neglected. While speech acts of securitization specify what policies should be undertaken to address the threats identified, visuals do not. There is always a need of interpretation.

4. What is an image?

To gain a deeper understanding on how images and visuality can influence and shape discourses we need to pose the question of what an image could be. The definition of ‚image‘ is a controversial issue (Boehm, 1994; Mitchell, 1994). There are different terms in different languages. Mitchell (1987: 7) claims that all images „whether they are mental, verbal or proper, need to be interpreted.“ What they means depends on how they are seen (Heck & Schlag, 2013:897).

Also controversial is if images own auto-activity or if they always depend on the verbal framing they are presented in. This relates to the point discussed before, if images have performative power or if they are used to support and illustrate the dominant narrative given by the linguistic framing. The question is not only how images function within the narrow frames of a particular paper or magazine, and within elite political discourse, but in culture at large (Andén- Papadopoulos, 2008:7). How is meaning produced through images and when they circulate in specific cultures?

Images are neither pre-existing objects nor representations of an unproblematic reality they simply depict. They are the ontological effect of the discursive and material relation between pictures, their producers and spectators. “Images which contradict or disrupt a dominant discursive frame might have a considerable impact, if not directly on politics and policy-making, then more so on popular imagination and historical consciousness.”(Andén-Papadopoulos, 2008:6) The question to be posed here is, what is shown, what is seen and how does this affect the emotions of the spectator. To understand what is important in the process of showing and seeing this article will go deeper into the relation of securitizing images and power.

5. Visuality as power

Power is an attribute structuring the whole society and world we live in. It is articulated through discourse which is limited by words. There is nothing outside of discourse, apart from the things that are not possible to be articulated yet (Foucault, 1982). Power structures also have great influence on visuality. They structure how images can be understood and how they are discussed in society. They often support dominant narratives but can also be a factor of disrupting the dominant narrative by showing and distributing an iconic image. Power structures influence significantly what is shown and what is seen in the discourse of security. The common saying

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„there is nothing to see here“ reflects and shows a certain hierarchy of subject positions deciding on what is shown and what stays hidden (Mirzoeff, 2011). There are dominant narratives, which are more likely to be seen and trigger actions whereas minored narratives are less likely to be seen or believed in. This is problematic not only because minored narratives are not likely to be seen but also because images, mainly journalistic images, in the news have the status of unmediated “windows” on the world and photographs serve to guarantee the objectivity and truth value of these news reported. Also of importance in this context is the construction of identity, particularly national identity through othering-processes. The construction of identity through discourse and the establishment of chains of equivalences are essential in International Relations since identity always needs an antagonist to be constituted by discourse.(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985)

This also functions through visuality: Power-structures and hegemonic projects decide what to believe in and what to take as reality. Some researchers even say that images can speak louder than words. Hence, they become celebrated cultural symbols, which reflect and reinforce national mythologies (Zelizer 1998,1999).

6. Seeing the Extraordinary in International Relations

In the last section of this paper I will bring together the theoretical approaches of power- structures, auto-activity and performativity of images and show how visuality shapes discourses and how power-structures wipe out minor perspectives while supporting dominant narratives and dominant security definitions.

In order to answer these question this paper will focus on two examples, namely postcolonialism and neo-colonial structures performed through visuality and the visual construction of female and its impact on Security studies.

6. 1 Postcolonialism and visuality in International Relations

Postcolonial Theory is an academic study of the consequences of colonialism and its traces in nowaday’s societies and its effects on different political spheres like International Relations. Postcolonial Theory rejects the universalizing tendencies of academics and politics and discloses subaltern narratives. Its aim is to make subaltern narratives visible and empower subjects of minor positions (Varela & Dhawan, 2015: 17).

Postcolonial structures have implications on how (in)security is depicted and understood. Postcolonial theorists claim that people of color and the spaces they occupy neglected in the dominant discourse on security. And in case they are made visible then often through the representation of the dominant narratives. They often have no space and power to present themselves, their voice is not heard in the discourse. This shows a certain relationship and the

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powerstructure between the persons that are visualized and the those who visualize. To illustrate this theory further, this paper will present the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011.

The events of the 2. May 2011 when Osama bin Laden was found in his compound in Abbottabad in Pakistan have been narrated repeatedly from the US standpoint (Dixit, 2014:337). A small group of US intelligence officers carried out the operation and killed bin Laden after a firefight. Pakistan as well as Osama bin Laden himself are missing in most of the narratives. They often focus on the operating group of SEALS as being heroic and with courage and extraordinary ability.

The first question to be asked when it comes to visual framing is who saw bin Laden being shot? The answer would be, that nobody saw him apart from some soldiers of the operating group that were in the same room when it happened. In the situation room of the US government a blackout of 20 minutes during the operation kept the surveying politicians from following the live-stream. Here we can see the importance of media and narrative construction that begin after the event since they had to reconstruct what happened there. The picture of the dead body was held back so it had to be made plausible to make sure the killing really took place.

In this US-narrative it is interesting to see that Pakistan is constructed as a bystander in the operation, and also the people that were killed during the raid perish from the discourse. In the media they were represented as collateral damage, while Pakistani media mentioned them as real persons with individual character traits/ personalities.

Moreover in the US-narrative there was no notion of the illegitimacy of the operation in which one state (the US) just entered another state‘s territory to kill one individual, in this case bin Laden. The state Pakistan as well as the colored bodies were wiped out of the discourse, which is related with the power-structures I referred to before. Another important point is the so called hideout of Osama bin Laden which was a big compound visible in the everyday life of the Pakistani people. Moreover, it was not in the outback but in one of Pakistan‘ s bigger cities. Osama bin Laden managed his daily life there, had contact with neighbors and was not as hidden as to be expected from US-narrative. In their view it was clear that a terrorist, which is constructed as a criminal, would be scared of being uncovered and being rightfully judged and hiding in a cave far away from civilization.

What we can see here is the construction of a dominant narrative by framing images and replace missing images through images constructed by language. To wipe out colored bodies is one aspect of postcolonial structures in International Relations. Another often observable construction in studies is a certain depiction of the “other” through images and news coverage. David Campbell focused on this aspect in his article “Geopolitics and visuality: Sighting the Darfur conflict”. He states that images contribute to the development of an imagined geography

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in which dichotomies of for example West/East, North/South and developed and underdeveloped. They therefore have impact on the self-definition or identity of the producers of these images. (Campbell, 2007) When it comes to Security Studies these dichotomies are often associated with the good and the bad and therefore used as a justification of humanitarian war. The acting state defines itself and its actions as just and civilized bringing democracy and human rights whereas the other is constructed as barbaric and in need of intervention. People from the global south are often constructed as being passive and as needing “our” pity. The discourse suppresses the heterogeneous identity of the “other” and construct an antagonistic version of the “self”.

6. 2 Gender and Visuality in International Relations

The construction of “self” and “other” also plays a significant role when it comes to gender as a category in International Relations. As I wrote above “the other” is often constructed as passive and in need of pity or even written out of the discourse. These attributes are historically and discursively associated with femininity and transferred to objects of International Relations.

To introduce the topic of gender I will sum up shortly in which cases gender plays a role recently in International Politics.
In 2014 300 Chibok girls and young women were kidnapped by Boko Haram. Thousands of Yazidi girls were sold into sex slavery by the Islamic State, whereas many women migrated to and took up arms for Islamic State. Moreover domestic violence rates were on rise in 2015. Women are disproportionately affected by disease outbreaks as well as by migration patterns. They are underrepresented in halls of power almost everywhere in the world and over represented among the poor and uneducated. But what is it about women that causes them to be treated differently? And why do we see women soldiers, women politicians and women leaders as women first and as soldiers, politicians and leaders second? (Sjoberg; Fontoura, 2017:172ff.) These are questions that Feminist IR Studies and activists interested in gender and International Relation ask. Very important when talking about feminist International Relation Studies is the distinction between the two concepts of sex and gender which are often used as synonyms but which are not similar. Sex usually indicates a biological category, whereas the concept of gender refers to the social expectations assigned to people based on their understood or internally or externally defined or identified biological sex. Men are expected to be masculine, women are expected to be feminine. What femininity and masculinity means depends on the historical, social and political discourse. Masculinity is often associated with attributes like strength, rationality, objectivity, aggressiveness, independence and they occupy the political, public sphere. Femininity is often associated with the private sphere, interdependence, weakness, subjectivity and passiveness.

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But there is not a unique idea of masculinity and femininity but different competing notions. The social and cultural dominant understanding is called hegemonic masculinity or femininity. These concepts are social constructions, product and producer at the same time. They are not only associated with bodies but also with actors in the International Relations like states, war, institutions and organizations.

In war times for example the threat or the state to be intervened in, is often constructed as being female, weak, in need of intervention and unstable. Also when it comes to war, visuality and gender are often used as a way to legitimize wars and glorify them as ‚just wars‘ or ‚humanitarian wars‘. „[L]ooking at the effects of war through gendered lenses, we find that war is a cultural construction that depends on myths of protection. Such myths have been important in upholding the legitimacy of war” (Tickner & Sjoburg, 2006: 194).

This mystification often shows that female bodies are in need of protection thus becoming an integral part of the legitimizing of war. The female body is constructed as being in need of protection. One example would be the cover of the Time Magazine which showed a young afghan women whose nose is cut of. Her name is Aisha and in the article her story was presented as being representative for all afghan women. The subtitle of the Images is: What happens if we leave Afghanistan? (Time Magazine 9. August 2010).

This image, in combination with the subtitle, legitimized the US intervention in Afghanistan and constructed it as a ‚good‘ humanitarian war for women‘ s rights. Some feminist supported this narrative while others were more critical, claiming that the war was never intended to be fought for the dignity of women and women’s rights. Further the idea of deciding over the fate of Afghan women is linked to a certain hierarchy reproduced by such actions.

Another aspect is, that the abuse took place under Taliban regime after US-troops intervened, so the presence of the soldiers did not prevent cases like Aischas abuse. The image of Aischa transports however the binary gender expectations. The women in need of protection and the soldiers as just warriors to fight for the dignity of women.

Another example where visuality and the female body were important in International Relations is the kidnapping of 300 young women and girls mentioned in the introduction. The ‚girls‘ or ‚schoolgirls‘ are constructed as being really young through media, while in reality most of them were around 18 or 19 years old. This constructs the image of girls not able to act for themselves.

7. Conclusion:

This paper aimed to outreach the role of visuality in critical security studies. Moreover, it discussed the performative power of images and existing power-structures transferred and reproduced by images and their distribution and reception. Afterwards this paper showed two

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examples of seeing the extraordinary in International Relations such as postcolonial structures and gender.
As the paper showed the topic of visuality plays a significant role in International Relations and Global Politics. Images differ from words and have therefore a specific impact on the production of knowledge and meaning. The controversial question if images have performative power can not be solved within this paper but the examples given in this article gave an impression of the impact images can have on shaping the discourse.

Additionally, this paper tries to show the extraordinary in International Relations, both in relation to power structures that limit the framing of narratives and in relation to the aspect of performativity.
As we can see power structures also effect the availability of images and minor perspectives. There are images more likely to be seen than others.

But in times where more people have the ability to organize globally and to distribute their images through the internet, the power of those images and their influence on global politics have to be focused on in more depth. But nevertheless it has to be kept in mind that images do not show an objective reality. On the contrary they only transfer a reality that is shaped by underlying conventions, power structures, censorship and political interests. Moreover, other invisible discursive structures influence the availability of images like the construction of “self” and “other” which is reflected very rare in society.

Therefore more research is needed when it comes to theory building as well as methodology. How do images produce meanings and knowledge. Does this knowledge differ from the knowledge produced by language?
Do images have the power to convey and connote things that cannot be articulated in discourse yet and therefore shift and frame new discourses? Or is the power of images overestimated and they only illustrate the dominant narrative?

These questions couldn’t be answered fully in this paper but need to be focused in further researches.

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References:

Andén-Papadopoulos (2008): The Abu Ghraib torture photographs, News frames, visual culture, and the power of images, Journalism 2008;9;5.

Blanchard, Eric M. (2003): Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 1289-1312 Published by: The University of Chicago Press.

Bleiker, R. (2001): The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory in: Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, 509-533.

Boehm, G. (1994): Was ist ein Bild?[What is an image?], München: Fink Verlag.

Butler, Judith (1993): Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York/London: Routledge.

Campbell (1992): Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, University of Minnesota Press.

Campbell (2007): Geopolitics and visuality: Sighting the Darfur conflict. Political Geography 26 (2007) 357-382.

Chowdhry, G./ Nair, S. (2004): Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations. Reading race, gender and class, New York/ London: Routledge.

Delmont, M. (2013). Introduction: Visual Culture and the War on Terror. American Quarterly 65 (1), 157-160. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Der Derian, J. (2001): Virtuous war: Mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment complex. Westview, Boulder, CO.

Dixit, Priya (2014): Decolonizing visuality in security studies: Reflections on the death of Osama bin Laden, Critical Studies on Security, Vol.2, No.3, 337-351.

Faludi, S. (2007): The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post 9/11 America. New York: Metropolitan Books.

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Foucault (2015): Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften, 23. Auflage Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main.

Foucault, Michel (1982): The Subject and Power in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982), 777-795 Published by: The University of Chicago Press.

Griffin, M. (1999): “The great War Photographs: Constructing Myths of History and Photojournalism”, in B. Brennen and H. Hardt (eds.) Picturing the Past. Media, History, Photography, 122-157. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Hansen, Lena (2011): Theorizing the image for Security Studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis, European Journal of International Relations 17(1) 51–74.

Heck, A., & Schlag, G. (2013). Securitizing images: The female body and the war in Afghanistan, in European Journal of International Relations, 19(4), 891-913.

Kellner, D. (1995). Media culture: Cultural studies, identify and politics between the modern and the postmodern. London: Routledge.

Laclau, Ernesto; Mouffe, Chantal (1985): Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso.

Luhmann, N./ Cross, K. (trans.) (2000): The Reality of the Mass Media. Stanford University Press.

Merrill, J. C. (1995). Global journalism. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Mitchell, W.J.T. (1994): Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mitchell, W. J. T. (1984): New Literary History, Vol. 15, No. 3, Image/Imago/Imagination (Spring, 1984), 503-537

Mitchell WJT (1987) Iconology: Images, Text, Ideology. Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press.

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Mirzoeff, N. (2011). The right to look. In Critical Inquiry, 37(3), 473-496.

Perlmutter, D. (1998). Photojournalism and foreign policy: Framing icons of outrage in international crisis. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Sjoberg, L. Fontoura, N. (2017): Gender 172-184 in Beeson, Mark/ Bisley, Nick: World Politics, Issues in 21st Century. 3. Edition, London: Palgrave.

Tickner/ Sjobourg (2006): Feminism. In: Dunne T, Kurki M and Smith S (eds) International Relation Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185- 202.

Varela, María do Mar Castro & Dhawan, Nikita (2015): Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung, 2., komplett überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Waever, O. (1995): Securitization and Desecuritization. In: Lipschutz RD (ed) On Security. New York Columbia University Press, 46-86.

Zelizer, B. (1998): Remembering to forget. Holocaust Memory through the Camera’s Eye. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Zelizer, B. (1999): “From the Image of Record to the Image of Memory: Holocaust Photography, Then and Now”, in B. Brennen and H. Hardt (eds.) Picturing the Past, Media, History, Photography, pp. 98-121. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Zelizer, B. (2001): Visual Culture and the Holocaust. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Online-Sources

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/09/facebook-reinstates-napalm-girl-photo

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/30/40-years-since-saigons-fall-napalm-attack- haunts-woman-in-iconic-image

(http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2007415,00.html)

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Appendix:

Images I referred to in the text:
1) War photography of the Vietnam war (Phan Thi Kim Phuc)

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phan_Thi_Kim_Phuc#/media/File:TrangBang.jpg) 2) Cover of the Time Magazine

(http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2007415,00.html)

 

Posted in Politische Theorie | Tagged Critical security studies, Postcolonialism, Visuality

ALL IN ONE BOAT? Or – What Corona has to do with social inequality and capitalism Again an article about the Corona crisis; but beware this is above all a critique of capitalism

By digitales.flugblatt.kollektiv on 2020/04/03

The spread of the corona virus has been preoccupying us all every day for weeks, and in the meantime the limitations of public life are also being felt. If you are still allowed to walk through the streets, you can hardly hear conversations off the beaten track. And that is understandable. There has never been such a pandemic in our globalised world before. It shows us how fast it can go and how little we are prepared. When the virus first appeared in December 2019 in Wuhan Province in China, everyone probably thought: “Well, China is far away and not Europe”. But the virus is not interested in borders and so it travelled with our global transfer structures to almost all parts of the world and dug its way into the last corner of our societies. Europe, which at first felt well prepared and weighed in security, was quickly taught a better lesson by first cases. Europe became the center of the expansion, which is mainly due to the fact that Europeans*, privileged by their passport and finances (at least a considerable part), can travel everywhere. Of course, globally networked work structures also play a major role.
Now the virus is here and spreads fast. At first, the reaction was to concentrate back on the nation states. Borders were closed, measures were decided and implemented in nation-states alone. The European project and European solidarity and solidarity in general were put on hold for the time being.
The motto seemed to be: Everyone is closest to himself. Even after the first shock, we see that solidarity has its limits and these ends mainly at national borders (or even at the borders of countries) and vital materials are reluctantly shared with the European neighboring states. There is hoarding, deliveries are intercepted or stopped. Within the border, the propaganda is simultaneously: “We are all in the same boat”. The “we-
feeling” rises and everyone reflects back on national cohesion. But who are “we” and are “we” really in the same boat or are there not rather small, rusty cutters and large luxury liners? The virus itself knows no social class, the crisis does. When the term “home office” was on everyone’s lips in the first few days, it was clear that this debate was being led by people who were able to work in this way. And that of course excludes most precarious jobs. Shop assistants, factory workers, hairdressers. The vast majority of jobs cannot be done from home. But this was not part of the debate at first. Only later did it become apparent that workers on the assembly line are particularly at risk because a minimum distance cannot be maintained. But the jobs must be continued, all for the profit. Here we have to take a look at automation of jobs, which was missed. And why was it missed? This is only to a limited extent due to a lack of technical skills. The argument is that jobs should be secured. But there is another reason behind it. Automation is not worth it, because cheap labour, which can be exploited properly, is more profitable. We could all survive this crisis better if many jobs were automated. Then those who are now doing them would not be at risk of contagion. Of course, automation would have to go hand in hand with a fair distribution of profit and the introduction of an unconditional basic income.
A basic income with which one can make a living. And that brings us to the next point. Many workers lose their jobs or are sent into short-time work. Or they have to do without wages due to childcare and unpaid leave. This makes it difficult for many people to pay the already dizzyingly high rents. The federal government has decided that in times of crisis no tenant can be dismissed due to rent debts. But this only shifts the problem to the back and disguises the real farce. Housing should not be subject to the capitalist market. What has already been called for in Berlin, namely the socialisation of housing companies, must now be pushed forward. Housing and living should not serve the profit of rich people. Not during the crisis and not after the crisis.
The stock market collapsed, of course, and the media conveyed the feeling that this affected us all. The news is dominated by reports of economic reviews etc. The focus is on capital, not people. For the time being, we don’t care if the stock market crashes, there are enough resources for everyone to survive. The problem is speculation and capitalism.
But back to the working conditions. After all the kindergartens and day-care centres were closed, another problem rolled in on a large part of the population, namely childcare. Again, we are not in the same boat. Privileged people who are able to have a home office may be annoyed by their children and their concentration may suffer, but it is not impossible for them to provide childcare. This is different for ordinary workers, where both partners are dependent on an income or with single parents in precarious employment. These can hope for unpaid leave or the goodwill of the
employer. Employers who are currently looking after their children in their home office. Even if this is not recommended, many desperate parents still bring their children to their grandparents – a risk group. Thus, the risk of infection also has a social class. We see that the risk of infection has to do with social class not only in the exercise of risky professions. Mobility is also a factor. While privileged people can take a car to work or for recreation, the poorer ones can only use public transport. In which the risk of infection is naturally higher, apart from the poorly paid bus drivers, train conductors, etc. Shops, except for groceries and pharmacies, are meanwhile closed. And we see who is still working. Nurses, shop assistants, bus drivers, etc. All jobs where the wage is barely enough to live.
At the moment a lot of German citizens are brought back from abroad. And that is good, we should not overlook that at the same time many people are deported unnoticed. Clammy and secretly. And also what happens in front of European borders gets out of focus. Fugitives in inhumane camps, where there is no mention of hygiene standards or minimum distances, are stuck in their fate. And Europe looks on and Europe looks away.
But even within its borders there are people who are particularly at risk. Homeless people, people who are illegal or who live in refugee accommodation in confined spaces. A special irony is also the moaning about missing harvest workers. It is right that they are missing now. This is mainly due to the fact that nationals do not want to work for a starvation wage, while people from other countries are dependent on it. The problem here is not the lack of harvesters, but the lack of workers who are capitalistically exploited. The problem is the bad pay and not that there is a lack of energetic hands. And again the problem is called capitalism.
What we also see is that the health system is overtaxing it. It lacks everything. Beds, staff and equipment. Of course, no one saw such a pandemic coming, and yet it must be remembered that the condition is due to capitalism. So while we have more than 1 million variations of TVs or decorative items, the situation with beds for intensive care patients* looks bad.
And a common applause from the balcony is meant nicely, but it won’t replace the missing workers or pay them better.
We are in a time of crisis. That is clear. And we should stick together. But we should also not forget that the crisis knows social inequality. That the risk of contagion knows inequality and that we should take the time to think about what is wrong in our system. The problem is capitalism, the problem is national identity. Dependence on the capitalist system ensures that work is maintained that is only for profit. Capitalism ensures that economic interests and the stock market take precedence over the well-being of people. National identity and egoism ensure closed borders, ensure that people die before our borders.
So like to pretend that we are in a boat, but after the crisis remember that there are big luxury liners and small rusty cutters! Let’s get the luxury liners!

 

– Ellen Carius

Posted in Politische Theorie | Tagged Capitalism, Corona, Discrimination, Social inequality

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